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I. INTRODUCTION 
As class action theorists, we tend to think heavily about when and 
whether to certify a class—whether attorneys are seeking principally 
equitable relief for a Rule 23(b)(2) class, what the limits of a fund should 
be before certifying a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class, and generally whether a 
group is cohesive enough for certification.  Sometimes we focus so much 
on determining when plaintiffs have met the certification threshold that 
we neglect to reassess the line itself.  To some, class action line drawing 
is an ontological question.  If a group meets certain certification criteria, 
then Rule 23 transforms the individual claims of those within it into 
“entity claims,” making the client the entity itself.1  Consequently, some 
scholars suggest that a certified class may have an ontological status 
apart from the aggregate of its individual members.2  Others find this 
preposterous.3  Of course, the theories differ slightly depending on the 
type of class.  But all theories employ roughly the same yardstick: do the 
procedurally aggregated individuals form a sufficiently cohesive group 
before the decision to sue?4 
Given this symposium’s topic—the state of aggregate litigation and 
the boundaries of class actions in the decade after Amchem Products, Inc. 
                                                     
 ∗ Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law.  I am indebted to Curtis 
Bridgeman, Thomas Burch, Brannon Denning, and Alexandra Lahav for their comments on previous 
drafts, to symposium participants for their thought-provoking questions, and to Laura Hines and the 
Kansas Law Review for organizing this symposium. 
 1. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
913, 919 (1998). 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 918–19 (noting that “the entity is the litigant and the client”); see also 
Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 26–27 
(1996); cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2002) (“[T]here is increasing skepticism over the view that a 
class action is simply an unaltered aggregation of individual claims.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the 
Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1590–97 (2007). 
 4. This is occasionally assessed at the time the plaintiffs move for class certification, if, for 
instance, they have narrowed their proposed class definition. 
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v. Windsor5 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.6—the time is ripe to challenge 
our assumptions about this yardstick.  Accordingly, this Article examines 
group cohesion and asks whether the current line is the only dividing line 
or even the correct one.  Although I rely on class action analogies, I am 
particularly concerned about mass-tort litigation that proceeds as 
nonclass litigation because it fails Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance test. 
A closer look at the aims of our current line reveals that it depends 
on common traits among class members to justify interest representation.  
This, of course, is not a new revelation, nor is it particularly surprising 
that scratching beneath the veneer of commonality often reveals a bevy 
of conflict.  Yet, historically, class action treatment traced actual group 
cohesion, which suggests an alternative means for binding present 
litigants in nonclass aggregation if we are less concerned about freezing 
interests in their pristine pre-litigation form.  If the judicial system 
encourages procedurally aggregated plaintiffs to communicate with one 
another about their litigation aims, injuries, and intentions, then they may 
form genuinely cohesive groups.  Accordingly, if courts look beyond the 
proxies used to evaluate pre-litigation unity to actual cohesion after the 
decision to sue, then they should permit like-minded plaintiffs to bind 
their collective interests. 
Part II considers some of the ironies in the current line-drawing 
scheme to make the case for a different line in nonclass aggregation.  In 
particular, Part II questions the authenticity of the “presumption of 
cohesion” that attaches to Rule 23(b)(2) class actions and whether the 
proxies used to test cohesion in Rule 23(b)(3) classes are realistic gauges 
of homogeneity.  Because group litigation evolved historically from 
actual, interconnected group rights, the modern iteration of Rule 23 tacks 
the moniker “cohesion” onto procedurally aggregated individuals with 
superficial similarities.  This leads some scholars to claim that the class 
action subverts individual autonomy and threatens fundamental aspects 
of a liberal democracy.7 
Still, my aim is not to attack the current line as it relates to class 
actions.  Rather, it is to say that if we are willing to look for genuine 
cohesion among individuals who are procedurally aggregated but lack 
sufficiently common traits before the decision to sue, then we will find 
an alternative and perhaps more compelling justification for binding 
collective interests.  Part III thus explains how genuine cohesion and 
                                                     
 5. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 6. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
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community among plaintiffs might occur.  While our basic definitions of 
community remain the same, modern communication methods have 
made it possible to develop and maintain affective ties with people 
outside of our immediate geographic location.  These new media allow 
plaintiffs without previous affiliations to create and sustain a sense of 
community based on their shared histories, experiences, and attributes. 
Finally, Part IV draws on the dominant justifications for group 
litigation—consent and interest representation—to explore this 
alternative line-drawing scheme in terms of political theory.  
Encouraging plaintiffs to form groups and reach decisions through 
deliberation relies on a mix of individual consent and moral obligation.  
Allowing plaintiffs to exercise their free will when deciding whether to 
associate with others preserves the liberal tenet of self-determination and 
escapes the anti-democratic criticism leveled at class actions.  Yet, a 
purely liberal approach fails to capture the obligatory aspect of reciprocal 
promises to cooperate and the communal obligations that attach.  
Although plaintiffs voluntarily enter into the group, once they are group 
members and have tied together their collective litigation fates, they 
should not be permitted to exit when doing so violates their 
commitments.  Of course, the community itself determines the content of 
its members’ rights and obligations to one another.  Thus, this section 
concludes by explaining the rationale for group autonomy in terms of 
pluralism and communitarianism. 
II. THE PARTY LINE 
The current line-drawing regime for class actions uses a snapshot 
approach: courts determine whether a homogeneous group of people 
with shared traits existed or shared those attributes before the litigation.  
The idea is to adjudicate rights in their pre-litigation form.  In this 
picture, rights and obligations are frozen in time; the “groupness” of a set 
of individuals is static.  Consider, for example, how judges determine 
whether to certify Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) claims. 
First, consider Rule 23(b)(2), where “the party opposing the class has 
acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so 
that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”8  Typical (b)(2) classes 
include employment-discrimination claims, where the employer fails to 
hire or promote people of a certain race or gender, or civil-rights 
                                                     
 8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
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violations, such as the school-desegregation cases.9  Because (b)(2) 
classes remedy group injuries through uniform relief, courts look for a 
clear group trait like race or gender and presume that class members are 
cohesive and homogeneous so long as that unifying trait existed before 
the litigation.10  Because (b)(2) class actions do not require opt-out 
opportunities,11 assuming cohesion allays judges’ qualms about due-
process concerns such as personal notice and the ability to exit.  A court 
daring to recognize potentially divergent interests would be hard-pressed 
not to provide notice and opt-out rights.12  Consequently, presuming that 
class members’ interests are cohesive, even when that presumption is 
fictitious, prevents the instabilities and opt-outs that jeopardize the 
collective good in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. 
Presuming pre-litigation cohesion is frequently just a convenient 
assumption.  Take, for instance, employment class actions where the 
group is ready-made: a certain category of employees work for a given 
employer.  As anyone who has been around a university department 
surely knows, professors may disagree over everything from curricular 
reform to which speakers to invite.  It is not surprising, then, that in any 
given employment class action there will be diverse preferences.  Some 
faithful employees will eschew the decision to sue at all, others will 
worry about retaliation, others may be risk adverse, and still others may 
want different relief.13 
Some courts are willing to look behind the imperial curtain and allow 
parties to rebut the “presumption of cohesion.”14  For instance, Judge 
                                                     
 9. See id. advisory committee’s note to 1966 Amendment. 
 10. See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 165 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(noting a “presumption of cohesion and unity between absent class members and the class 
representatives” when “class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief is sought”); Allison v. Citgo 
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 402 (5th Cir. 1998) (race); Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 
1144, 1155 n.8 (11th Cir. 1983) (race and gender); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 
248–49 (3d Cir. 1975) (gender); Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 257 F.R.D. 159, 170–72 (S.D. Ind. 2009) 
(finding age insufficient for a child-labor claim under the Alien Tort Statute); In re Methyl Tertiary 
Butyl Ether Prod. Liab. Litig. (MTBE Litig.), 209 F.R.D. 323, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Class members 
in a (b)(2) action must share some ‘preexisting legal relationship or [a] significant common trait such 
as race or gender.’” (quoting Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1155)). 
 11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)–(3). 
 12. See Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 139, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
 13. Similar problems arose in the 1970s school-busing cases; many parents would have 
preferred to avoid busing, violence, and poor (but integrated) schools.  See generally Derrick A. Bell 
Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 
85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
 14. Courts occasionally allow Rule 23(b)(2) classes to progress as such on the liability phase, 
but then permit notice and opt-out rights if class cohesion fails during the remedial stage.  See, e.g., 
Robinson, 267 F.3d at 166–67; Latino Officers Ass’n v. City of New York, 209 F.R.D. 79, 93 
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Scheindlin allowed defendants to rebut homogeneity by demonstrating 
that individual issues existed in the MTBE litigation.15  But other courts 
hold tightly to this presumption even in the face of heterogeneity.16  The 
point is, even in (b)(2) classes, plaintiffs’ opinions about risk, relief, and 
strategy may differ vastly even though plaintiffs share a similar trait 
before suing.17  Consequently, this assumption often camouflages what is 
truly only an amalgamation of people’s divergent interests. 
By contrast, in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, the predominance test 
asks “whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation.”18  Cohesion legitimizes collective 
representation.  But this is not necessarily group cohesion.  Courts 
typically use common characteristics—such as the same physical 
injuries, product, disaster, circumstances, or state laws—as proxies for 
class cohesion and homogeneity.19  The commonalities binding the 
proposed class must then predominate over individual interests.  One 
unusual example to the contrary is in appointing a lead plaintiff in Rule 
23(b)(3) securities class actions.  There, courts have been willing to 
designate a group as the lead plaintiff if its members have either a pre-
litigation or a post litigation relationship so long as they are cohesive, 
function together smoothly, and monitor the lawyers.20  To evaluate 
cohesiveness, courts do consider whether group members have a pre-
litigation relationship, but they also examine the members’ litigation 
involvement, plans to cooperate, sophistication level, and whether they 
chose counsel or vice versa.21 
                                                                                                                       
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 15. MTBE Litig., 209 F.R.D. at 343. 
 16. See, e.g., Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1130–32 (D.D.C. 1989).  Before this 
presumption emerged, some courts observed that unanimity was impossible and not a class action 
prerequisite.  See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 485–86 (5th Cir. 
1982); Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Poundstone, 169 F.R.D. 155, 161 (M.D. Ala. 1995). 
 17. See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1183–84 
(1982). 
 18. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). 
 19. See id. at 624. 
 20. See, e.g., Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., Nos. 07 Civ. 8538, 07 Civ. 8808, 07 Civ. 
9651, 07 Civ. 10400, 07 Civ. 10540, 2008 WL 2876373, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2008); In re 
Flight Safety Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 124, 129 (D. Conn. 2005); Xianglin Shi v. Sina 
Corp., Nos. 05 Civ. 2154 (NRB), 05 Civ. 2268 (NRB), 05 Civ. 2374 (NRB), 05 Civ. 2391 (NRB), 
05 Civ. 2503 (NRB), 05 Civ. 2826 (NRB), 2005 WL 1561438, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005); Local 
144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 00-3605 (DRD), 2000 WL 33173017, 
at *3–4 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2000); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 46 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 21. Varghese v. China Shenghuo Pharm. Holdings, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
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Rule 23(b)(3)’s counter-assumption to (b)(2) is, in part, 
economically driven.  A request for money jeopardizes cohesion.22  
Courts assume that people pursuing monetary claims are a less cohesive 
bunch both because monetary remedies are tied to individual merits and 
divergent interests, and because the more one has to lose, the less she 
may trust others with her claim.23  To be sure, part of the courts’ concern 
in (b)(3) classes is about due process—monetary claims carry with them 
property rights that injunctive and declaratory relief lack.  But the idea 
that monetary remedies are inherently divisive, whereas injunctive or 
declaratory relief is not, is at odds with reality.  A generous explanation 
for the difference might be the need for due process and its 
corresponding right to opt out; yet, courts go further than that.  They 
imply that when money is at stake, we will all behave as homo 
economicus and maximize our own outcome at the rest of the 
participants’ expense.24  That is, we will elevate our own self-interest 
over that of the other plaintiffs and thereby act discordantly. 
The point thus far has been that courts use several proxies to gauge 
pre-litigation homogeneity and unity among class members: in Rule 
23(b)(2) class actions the proxy is uniform relief, and in Rule 23(b)(3) 
class actions the proxy is preexisting common characteristics such as 
physical injuries and shared circumstances.  A closer look at the class 
action’s history reveals that these proxies evolved historically from 
actual, interconnected group rights. 
A. The Historical Line 
In medieval times, life revolved around one’s group memberships; 
the individual’s rights and privileges stemmed not from her autonomy 
but from her membership in a particular group.  Parishes, villages, 
guilds, boroughs, and frankpledge tithings were social and economic 
organizations as well as groups with collective obligations and rights.25  
                                                     
 22. Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’r, Local No. 139, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
 23. See Barabin v. Aramark Corp., No. 02-8057, 2003 WL 355417, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 
2003) (individual merits); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 412–13 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(individual merits); Ammons v. La-Z-Boy, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-67 TC, 2008 WL 5142186, at *19 (D. 
Utah Dec. 5, 2008) (decreased trust); Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 245 F.R.D. 478, 486 
(D. Colo. 2007) (decreased trust).  It is equally plausible that a plaintiff would be more likely to trust 
others when more money is at stake, particularly if they are experts and she is not. 
 24. See Barabin, 2003 WL 355417, at *1; Allison, 151 F.3d at 412–13. 
 25. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION 41–49 (1987).  Yeazell explains that a “frankpledge” was essentially a policing institution in 
which young males formed groups that were responsible for one another’s good behavior.  Id. at 43–
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Communal obligations and collective power were coterminous.  These 
joint obligations ran so deep that collectors could enforce debts from one 
member by demanding payment from another, simply because of her 
membership in the same community.26  Members of rural communities—
such as villages, frankpledge tithings, and parishes—did not choose to 
become group members in any meaningful, voluntary sense; rather, 
membership arose from geographic location.27  Townsfolk, grouped in 
exclusive guilds and boroughs, on the other hand, voluntarily chose 
group membership by accepting responsibility and financial 
obligations.28  Whether chosen or not, group membership and its 
collective rights and obligations was a way of life that largely went 
unquestioned. 
After the medieval period, plagues, famine, and the Reformation led 
to more modern bureaucratization and consolidated power in boroughs 
with taxes and corporations.29  Social groups were no longer coterminous 
with political ones.  As group litigation became an anomaly rather than 
the norm, the nineteenth-century public felt the need to explain it in 
terms of consent and representation.30  As Stephen Yeazell describes it, 
in the mid-1800s, the political thought of Frederic Calvert concerning 
interest representation and Edmund Burke’s notions about virtual 
representation reinvigorated group litigation.31 
It is here that we begin to see an interweaving of political theory and 
procedural thought.  Grappling with the ideological tensions that persist 
today, Calvert explained group litigation as interest representation and 
assumed that one person could represent others with similar interests.32  
Dividing “interest” into two meanings, he thought the word could mean 
either an interest in the property or transaction, or an interest in the 
question the litigation presents.33  Put differently, one might be interested 
in the object of the lawsuit or in the suit’s subject matter.  This latter 
interest paved the way for associations—such as homeowners’  
 
                                                                                                                       
44. 
 26. Id. at 61–63. 
 27. Id. at 41–52. 
 28. Id. at 58–68. 
 29. Id. at 100–08, 123–25. 
 30. Id. at 178. 
 31. Id. at 198–210. 
 32. Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of 
Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 224 (1990) (reviewing YEAZELL, supra note 25). 
 33. FREDERIC CALVERT, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW RESPECTING PARTIES TO SUITS IN 
EQUITY 5–7 (London, Saunders and Benning 1837). 
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associations, unions, and lodges—to sue on their members’ behalf and 
purportedly protect their collective interest.34 
Meanwhile, a few years earlier, Edmund Burke promoted a political 
version of interest representation and contended that there was no need 
for a geographic locale to have its own representative so long as another 
representative elsewhere shared that locale’s interests.35  From this came 
the idea of virtual representation where a nonparty is situated such that 
“one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to 
be his virtual representative.”36  In both political and procedural theory 
then, this notion further distanced representation from consent and tied it 
instead to interests. 
From this brief historical summary, three key points emerge.  First, 
our current line-drawing regime, which uses proxies for determining 
whether group homogeneity existed before the litigation, is rooted in (1) 
what used to be an actual community and (2) interest representation.  
Thus, in one sense, these proxies have become convenient fictions for 
assuming group cohesion, much like the renewed judgment as a matter of 
law is a convenient turn of phrase to circumvent the Seventh 
Amendment’s reexamination clause.37  The historical predicates to these 
proxies turned on a mix of consent—through voluntarily joining social 
organizations in medieval times or, according to Calvert, joining a 
lawsuit affecting one’s interests—and purely similar interests.  Second, it 
becomes apparent that our now near-divorced conceptions of law and 
sociality used to be quite closely linked.  Rather than thinking about 
procedural law or social norms, both are integral to a holistic 
understanding of either.  Our inherent sociality and ideology matter 
immensely to our understanding of group cohesion, group representation, 
and procedural aggregation.  Third, scratching beneath the surface of the 
modern-day presumptions of class cohesion commonly reveals 
heterogeneity, not homogeneity.  Accordingly, in a society founded on 
individual rights, we continue to struggle with notions of consent and 
interest representation to justify binding collective interests. 
                                                     
 34. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. 
CT. REV. 337, 364 (1999). 
 35. YEAZELL, supra note 25, at 205–06. 
 36. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975).  Taylor v. Sturgell 
contains the Supreme Court’s most recent word on virtual representation.  128 S. Ct. 2161, 2178 
(2008) (disapproving a theory of preclusion by virtual representation).  Intervention in Rule 24 relies 
on much the same concept. 
 37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (allowing renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law). 
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B. Democratic Drawbacks of the Current Line 
In its modern form, the class action has been attacked from all sides 
for many reasons.  Of particular interest here, however, is the criticism 
that current class action litigation is undemocratic.  As Martin Redish 
contends, the class action reworks substantive laws and thereby 
circumvents the democratic process by undermining accountability and 
representation.38  He sees today’s class action as essentially a shell game, 
a purportedly procedural device that does not actually compensate and 
operates instead as a tool for rogue bounty hunters who act without the 
legitimacy of substantive authorization.39  Reading the class action’s 
historical development, he contends: 
On the one hand, while early English practice did authorize certain 
forms of purely collective adjudication, it appears that in none of those 
contexts were individuals forced to adjudicate substantive rights that, in 
their pristine pre-litigation form, were individually held.  Rather, 
collective adjudication was permitted only when the individual’s 
substantive rights were held as part of a pre-existing entity.40 
Underlying this critique is the further argument that forcing collective 
adjudication of individually held rights subverts individual autonomy, a 
concept so important to modern American thought that it runs throughout 
both our judicial and political system.  Here, Redish contends that “the 
modern class action also threatens core notions of liberal democracy on a 
micro level, by restricting the individual’s autonomous ability to employ 
the judicial process as a means of protecting her substantive legal 
rights.”41  In this manner, class actions undermine individual liberal 
values such as integrity, autonomy, and self-worth. 
In sum, our current pre-litigation line-drawing scheme: (1) 
presupposes unity where none exists; (2) relies on proxies such as skin 
color, gender, common injuries, similar circumstances, and comparable 
state laws to determine whether individuals, who may be nothing more 
than procedurally aggregated, constitute a “group”; (3) employs 
representative notions based on the fiction these proxies create and 
thereby undermines individual autonomy and integrity; and (4) raises 
                                                     
 38. MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE 21–61 (2009); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions 
and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 81–82. 
 39. Redish, supra note 38. 
 40. REDISH, supra note 38, at 230. 
 41. Id. at 229. 
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democratic concerns about accountability and representation.  On the 
positive side, this line provides a fixed point in time for assessing Rule 
23’s requirements and thereby avoids the ambiguity of assessing 
cohesion for a moving target.  Rule 23(b)(2)’s presumption of cohesion 
is pragmatic, if not realistic.  Without the presumption, divergent 
interests could ruin the efficiency and momentum gained by collectivity 
as well as make uniform relief difficult to fashion.  Proxies such as skin 
color, gender, and common circumstances are easier for both lawyers and 
judges to assess on the fly; they need not dig too deeply to determine 
cohesion.  Finally, because class actions by definition involve absent 
class members, the current line avoids the stickiness of attempting to 
involve thousands of potentially disinterested people in the litigation and 
thereby undermining the class’s efficiency gains. 
This pre-litigation line also means that courts certify fewer putative 
(b)(3) class actions, particularly products-liability or personal-injury 
claims.  The combination of Amchem, Ortiz, the Class Action Fairness 
Act, and the trend toward requiring plaintiffs to establish Rule 23’s 
certification criteria by a preponderance of the evidence has substantially 
decreased the likelihood that a judge will certify a mass-tort class 
action.42  Yet, this does not mean that these actions will not proceed en 
masse.  One need look only to the recent Zyprexa or Vioxx litigation for 
evidence of thousands of parties litigating nominally related claims in the 
same forum.43  But, because these claims are not certified as class 
actions, they proceed in a procedural no man’s land—somewhere in 
between individual litigation and class action litigation, but without the 
protections of either.44 
                                                     
 42. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).  The following cases illustrate the preponderance of the 
evidence standard as well as a corresponding willingness to look into the merits of the case at class 
certification.  See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he task for plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate that the element of antitrust impact 
is capable of proof at trial . . . .”); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 
261, 268 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 23’s requirements must be given their full weight independent of the 
merits.”); In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 40 (2d Cir. 2006) (“This standard of review implies that 
a district judge has some leeway as to Rule 23 requirements . . . .”); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., 
Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f some of the considerations under Rule 23(b)(3) . . . 
overlap the merits . . . then the judge must make a preliminary inquiry into the merits.”). 
 43. In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611–12 (E.D. La. 2008); In re Zyprexa 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Howard M. Erichson, 
Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in 
Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 386–401 (2000) (discussing plaintiffs’ coordination). 
 44. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations 8 
(Feb. 28, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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As I have explored elsewhere, this no man’s land fosters: (1) agency 
problems between the attorney and her clients (misallocation incentives, 
inadequate attorney-client communication, and an inability for clients to 
monitor their case); (2) group problems between nominally related 
plaintiffs (incentives to holdout in settlements requiring near unanimity, 
outliers who want no part of group membership, and subgroup 
competition); and (3) competition problems between plaintiffs’ 
attorneys.45  Accordingly, the remainder of this Article focuses on 
nonclass aggregation and imagines that drawing another line might 
overcome some of the concerns with the current class action scheme.  
Just as courts have allowed cohesive groups to serve as lead plaintiffs in 
securities class actions, this new line is based on actual group cohesion, 
regardless of whether that cohesion predates or postdates the decision to 
sue.  It would also enable present plaintiffs with similar litigation ends 
and injuries to consciously join forces and bind their interests.  After all, 
the current line already joins litigants based on the fiction of cohesion.  
Imagine then the very real justification for binding individual claims 
when that cohesion is genuine and litigants actually form a group based 
on shared interests, desires, or ends. 
III. POST AGGREGATION COMMUNITY 
While the class action line, which requires some approximation of a 
preexisting group, has remained relatively stationary since its initial 1966 
iteration, our notion of community is fluid.  With economic 
independence and the autonomy that comes with it, our ideas about 
community and social networks have evolved.  While most of us would 
balk at having to pay our neighbor’s debts, as individuals did in medieval 
times, we are seeing a resurgence of community in both old and new 
outlets.  First, the old: given the recent economic downturn, at least 
anecdotally, people are relying on one another again and, as the 
catchphrase goes, “building stronger communities.”  There has been a 
rise in local food co-ops, community gardens, ride shares, buy-local 
movements, and microcredit projects.46  Second, the new: the Internet 
                                                     
 45. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 9–16 (2009); see also 
Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class 
Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519. 
 46. See generally Timothy C. Barmann, As Fuel Costs Rise, More People Opt to Share a Ride, 
PROVIDENCE J., July 30, 2008, available at NEWS BANK, Record No. 20080730-PJ-RIDE-
SHARING-20080730; John Harrington, Project Aims to Place a Garden Plot Within Walking 
Distance of Every Home, INDEP. REC. (Helena, Mont.), Oct. 11, 2009, available at http:// 
www.helenair.com/lifestyles/article_44a0fdbc-b61a-11de-885a-001cc4c03286.html; Zlati Meyer, 
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has ushered in a community that is both virtual and social.  We use text 
messages, blogs, instant messaging, and e-mail to communicate with one 
another.  Social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, and 
LinkedIn allow us to stay in touch with people from our former high 
school, college, and workplace communities.  In this sense, social sites 
reflect our offline, personal interaction.47  Sometimes these sites lead 
people to deepen their friendships by turning acquaintances into real 
friends.  They also allow us to make new friends and join virtual 
communities, groups, and message boards based on our common 
interests.  Put differently, we can expand our communality by sharing 
information and joining collective efforts.48 
Take, for example, the Navy’s website for “moms,” which includes 
multiple discussion threads, groups such as “Moms of Officers” and 
“Moms of Navy Musicians,” meeting kits for gathering with other Navy 
moms in one’s hometown, and links to blog posts, photos, and videos.49  
Its purpose is to give “members a place to discuss issues with others who 
share common concerns” and “provide an environment of understanding, 
comfort and belonging to all involved.”50  Similar websites exist for 
Army wives, Marine Corps wives, and even military children.51  
Likewise, during the recent economic crisis, homeowners have formed 
online groups and foundations to help individuals dealing with 
foreclosure and refinancing.52  Some of these communities even develop 
from shared tragedies and the group litigation that ensues.  There are, for 
instance, websites dedicated to the September 11, 2001 tragedy where 
people can post their stories and view pictures, videos, and documents;53 
                                                                                                                       
Rising Gas Prices Fuel Rise in Office Carpooling: Workers Say They Save Big, Enjoy Company, 
DET. FREE PRESS, May 14, 2007, at A3; Manoj Pant, Op-Ed., Financial Inclusion and Microcredit, 
ECON. TIMES (India), July 11, 2008, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion 
/columnists/manoj-pant/Financial-inclusion-and-microcredit/articleshow/3220182.cms; Allie Shah, 
Stillwater Food Co-Op Has Built Community of Shoppers, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Mar. 4, 
2008, available at http://www.startribune.com/local/east/16146732.html. 
 47. See NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES H. FOWLER, CONNECTED 270–71 (2009) (“[A]t 
their core, social-network sites primarily reflect offline interactions.”). 
 48. See id. at 275 (noting that communality has been modified by the Internet). 
 49. Navy for Moms, http://www.navyformoms.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2010). 
 50. Navy for Moms, About Us, http://www.navyformoms.com/page/about-us (last visited Jan. 
21, 2010). 
 51. Army Wives, http://www.armywives.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2010); Marine Corps Wives, 
http://www.marinewives.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2010); Military Kidz, http://www.military 
kidz.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2010). 
 52. See, e.g., Avoid Foreclosure, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Avoid-Foreclosure/ 
(comprising a group of 854 members dedicated to helping “people get back on their feet” and 
preventing people from going into foreclosure) (last visited Jan. 21, 2010). 
 53. The September 11 Digital Archive, http://911digitalarchive.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2010). 
0.6.0_BURCH FINAL 5/10/2010  12:42:20 PM 
2010] AGGREGATION, COMMUNITY, AND THE LINE BETWEEN 901 
sites for survivors of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita;54 and groups for 
“People against Paxil” and Vioxx Plaintiff Education Groups.55  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys form groups and consortia of their own, such as the 
“Katrina Litigation Group.”56  In sum, commonalities ranging from 
having a child in the Navy to mass disasters to tragic drug side effects 
bring people together globally. 
These new communication media take us from local communities to 
worldwide communities that form from shared experiences, interests, 
desires, and commitments.  They augment our ideas of community.  Our 
fundamental notions about what constitutes a community have remained 
consistent, but both the media and the moral obligations have evolved.  
For instance, de Tocqueville’s observation that associations shape 
American societies remains true,57 but new communication means and 
methods have made it possible to associate with people beyond our 
territorial communities. 
While some definitions of “community” are static, rooted in territory, 
and include people living in the same area or interacting populations 
(towns, neighborhoods, or cities), others capture the relational 
community as “a group linked by a common policy” and “a body of 
persons . . . having a common history or common social, economic, and 
political interests.”58  These latter definitions clarify that community is 
not just about where we live, but about our relationships and affective 
ties with one another.  Community in this sense grows out of social 
relationships with reciprocity and mutuality.59  Thus, key features of the 
                                                     
 54. Hurricane Digital Memory Bank, http://hurricanearchive.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2010). 
 55. People Against Paxil, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=5445754283 (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2010); Paxil (and Other Antidepressants) Survivors, http://www.facebook.com 
/group.php?gid=2246304004 (last visited Jan. 21, 2010); Vioxx Plaintiff Education Group, 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MerckSettlement/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2010); see also Byron G. 
Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863, 
919–21 (2005). 
 56. For the opinion disqualifying the Katrina Litigation Group after Dickie Scruggs was 
arrested, see McIntosh v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV1080 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 4, 2008) 
(Op. on Mot. to Disqualify), available at http://www.mssd.uscourts.gov/Insurance%20Opinions 
/ch06cv1080orderA0912.pdf. 
 57. In an often-cited passage, Alexis de Tocqueville states, “Americans of all ages, all 
conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations.  They have not only commercial and 
manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds . . . .”  2 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 128 (Henry Reeve trans., Schocken Books 
1961) (1835). 
 58. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Community, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/community (last visited Jan. 21, 2010). 
 59. See THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 122–28 (1978); 
Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 25 (1989). 
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definition used here include membership (belongingness with 
boundaries), influence, integrating and fulfilling needs, and shared 
emotional connections (history, experiences, and commonalities).60 
When we compare these expansive definitions of community and the 
evolving media for forming communities with our stationary legal ideas 
about cohesion, our current line-drawing scheme appears outdated.  
Cohesion is static in that courts measure the proxies—requesting uniform 
relief and having common characteristics that predate the litigation—at a 
particular point in time.  And plaintiffs with procedurally aggregated tort 
claims are unlikely to exhibit the fundamental attributes of a cohesive 
local community—social bonds, social activities, and community 
attachment.61  But what if by using new media we could return to the 
core cohesion seen in small, rural medieval communities without the 
corresponding geographic restrictions?  Put differently, what if we traced 
actual cohesion regardless of when or where it arose?  This amended 
line-drawing scheme conceives of groups as individuals who exhibit 
actual affective ties with each other and avoids, as Thomas Bender puts 
it, the “cynical manipulation of symbols of community.”62  Bringing 
litigants together in nonclass aggregation through multidistrict transfers, 
claim consolidation, and party joinder can shape relationships, result in 
plaintiffs forming social bonds, and change the character of those 
associations into real communities. 
Still, my intention is not to propose a radical restructuring of Rule 23 
or to suggest that we re-envision the line for true class actions with 
absent class members.  Instead, my concern is with a particular subset of 
would-be class litigation—mass-tort litigation—where plaintiffs care 
enough to bring individual suits.  Those suits might be aggregated by the 
claimants, their attorneys, or administratively through multidistrict 
transfer and consolidation before a single judge.63  Although these 
plaintiffs have retained their own attorney and are present as compared 
with absent class members, the sheer number of other plaintiffs makes it 
difficult for attorneys to communicate regularly with their clients and 
means that clients tend to be poor monitors.  Therefore, it is in nonclass 
aggregation that I am suggesting a change.64 
                                                     
 60. David W. McMillan & David M. Chavis, Sense of Community: A Definition and Theory, 14 
J. COMM. PSYCHOL. 6, 9 (1986). 
 61. See generally John Kasarda & Morris Janowitz, Community Attachment in Mass Society, 39 
AM. SOC. REV. 328 (1974) (describing how associational networks affect communities). 
 62. BENDER, supra note 59, at 144. 
 63. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 (Proposed Final Draft 
2009). 
 64. This proposed change should not function retroactively to certify an overarching class 
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If the current class action scheme justifies binding interests because 
they are “similar” (interest representation), then the change that I am 
suggesting is different in kind.  It is based on neither a pure fiction of 
similar interests nor on pure consent, but is a blend of the two, with 
heavy weight on both.  The basic idea is this: once aggregation—
procedural or purposeful—brings people together, giving them the 
opportunity to interact with one another and discuss their commonalities 
may lead them to form actual, cohesive groups.  Plus, new 
communication media make it possible for plaintiffs to interact regularly. 
Given that “presumed cohesion” justifies binding absent litigants to a 
class action judgment, if group cohesion in nonclass aggregation is real 
then there is ample historical and theoretical justification for allowing 
plaintiffs to limit their ability to pursue their own claims.  When litigants 
form groups and morally obligate themselves to other group members 
through voluntary promises and assurances, it makes sense to reinforce 
those obligations legally (or socially) and bind plaintiffs’ collective 
interests regardless of whether their cohesion predated or postdated the 
decision to sue.65  Because I have elaborated on both this theoretical 
framework for litigating together and methods for implementing the 
framework elsewhere, I won’t rehash either here.66  Instead, first, by 
reconsidering interest representation and consent in the context of 
political theory, I suggest that redrawing the line around actual groups 
avoids Redish’s argument that group litigation is antidemocratic.  
Second, continuing to explore the alternative line-drawing scheme in 
political terms, the final section draws from pluralism and 
communitarianism to sketch a political framework for promoting group 
governance.  Drawing this new line requires us to afford group autonomy 
to plaintiffs by allowing them—with the help of a special officer—to 
self-govern.67 
                                                                                                                       
where none would exist otherwise. 
 65. Burch, supra note 45, at 41–47. 
 66. Burch, supra note 44; Burch, supra note 45. 
 67. I embrace a weaker form of “group autonomy” because the special officer serves an 
advisory function.  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains the notion of group autonomy 
as follows: 
When people living in some region of the world declare that their group has the right to 
live autonomously, they are saying that they ought to be allowed to govern themselves.  
In making this claim, they are, in essence, rejecting the political and legal authority of 
those not in their group.  They are insisting that whatever power these outsiders may have 
over them, this power is illegitimate; they, and they alone, have the authority to 
determine and enforce the rules and policies that govern their lives. 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Personal Autonomy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personal-
autonomy/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2010). 
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IV. AGGREGATING AS A DEMOCRATIC ENTERPRISE 
Thus far, I have contended that group cohesion, regardless of 
whether it arises before or after the decision to sue, justifies binding 
collective interests.  Of course, this must be clarified a bit.  In litigation, 
this holds true only if—after proper sorting with the help of a third-party 
neutral (the “special officer”)—plaintiffs share means and ends.68  
Because plaintiffs aggregated procedurally under Rule 20 or transferred 
through the multidistrict litigation statute may share only a common 
question of law or fact, their hopes, desires, and intentions toward the 
litigation may vary wildly.69  But in the course of talking things over 
with one another, plaintiffs might realize that their means and ends mesh.  
They may begin to think of themselves as being in community with each 
other.  Smaller communities may exist within the larger body of 
litigation, making the issue of governance between groups similar to that 
between subgroups and the polity.  With this similarity comes all of the 
attendant problems of intergroup relationships, defining membership, 
and group autonomy. 
To explain how drawing a line around actual groups overcomes the 
democratic critique in a way that class actions may not, consider again 
the notions of consent and interest representation.  When plaintiffs meet 
one another, form groups, discuss their litigation ends, and further 
specify those ends through deliberation, they have an opportunity to 
participate and be heard in the process.  Group deliberation thus serves as 
a proxy for direct participation in the judicial process, which tends to 
become less meaningful and practical as the number of plaintiffs 
increase.70  By both consenting—through making promises and 
assurances to one another to cooperate—and by participating in the 
decision-making process, individuals retain some autonomy and 
influence over collective decisions.71  Granted, because they are part of a 
collective and “in it together,” they have less autonomy than they might 
in an individual lawsuit.  But in exchange for pure autonomy, they gain 
                                                     
 68. This idea and the use of a special officer is expanded greatly in Burch, supra note 44. 
 69. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (authorizing multidistrict litigation); FED. R. CIV. P. 20 
(authorizing permissive joinder). 
 70. See Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. 
REV. 65, 79–82 (2003) (stating that “courts understand opt outs as a pure expression of claimant 
autonomy”). 
 71. See generally Ronald Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS 
ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 54, 61 (John Christman ed., 1989) (stating that “[t]he full formula for 
autonomy . . . is authenticity plus procedural independence”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits 
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978) (advocating increased participation in 
adjudication). 
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greater bargaining power, sustain a credible threat against the defendant, 
reduce their transaction costs, and decrease the informational 
asymmetries that arise between disaggregated plaintiffs and a common 
defendant.72  In short, by making promises and assurances to other 
plaintiffs and by forming a group, the plaintiff has determined that the 
benefits of litigating together outweigh the loss of individual decision-
making autonomy. 
It is here that I would like to introduce some threads of political 
theory for two relatively limited purposes.  The first is to make the point 
that our theoretical options are not limited to either social-welfare 
maximization or individual autonomy.  Instead, strands of 
communitarianism (or, as some in the field label it, republicanism73) can 
explain and harmonize the process in ways that welfare maximization 
and individual autonomy cannot.  My hesitance is that, although those 
terms help avoid Redish’s democratic critique and are convenient 
shorthand for some of the ideas I find important, they also introduce a 
flood of other implications that have little to do with the fairly narrow 
point that I am making here.  Nevertheless, I find them useful to rely on 
with that caveat in place.  Second, once we start to think about the 
plaintiffs in nonclass aggregation as being in a community of sorts, then 
we can also use democratic thought to explore how much leeway the 
judicial system should afford them to self-govern. 
A. Rethinking the Democratic Difficulty with a Community of Plaintiffs 
Thinking about group litigation in political terms raises similar 
arguments to those raised in a much larger debate over the individual’s 
role in the democratic state.  In political theory, the individual’s place in 
the polity lies at the heart of the debate between liberals and 
communitarians, or as Charles Taylor urges, between atomists and 
holists.74  Of interest here—without wading in too deeply—is how each 
school of thought perceives the individual’s role in society. 
Although both liberals and communitarians value self-determination, 
liberalism elevates individual autonomy.  According to John Rawls and 
his “justice as fairness” argument, individual autonomy allows people to 
                                                     
 72. Burch, supra note 44, at 48–49. 
 73. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and Republicanism: Friends or Foes?  A Reply to 
Richard Dagger, 61 REV. POL. 209, 209 (1999) (stating that Sandel uses the name “republicanism”). 
 74. Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in DEBATES IN 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 195, 195 (Derek Matravers & Jonathan E. Pike eds., 
2003). 
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act “from principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that 
best express their nature as free and equal rational beings.”75  Democratic 
communitarianism, on the other hand, sees history, social norms, and the 
process of living in society as crucial elements of individual 
development.  Communitarianism thus does not reduce all moral claims 
to what an individual would consent to or choose; rather, it contends that 
individuals can incur responsibilities to one another simply by virtue of 
being fellow citizens.76 
Michael Walzer explains the liberal-communitarian debate in terms 
of less-voluntary forms of association; his words are worth quoting at 
length: 
[P]eople are born into very important sorts of groups, born with 
identities, male or female, for example, working class, Catholic or 
Jewish, black, democrat, and so on.  Many of their subsequent 
associations (like their subsequent careers) merely express these 
underlying identities, which, again, are not so much chosen as enacted.  
Liberalism is distinguished less by the freedom to form groups on the 
basis of these identities than the freedom to leave the groups and 
sometimes even the identities behind.  Association is always at risk in a 
liberal society.  The boundaries of the group are not policed; people 
come and go, or they just fade into the distance without ever quite 
acknowledging that they have left.  That is why liberalism is plagued 
by free-rider problems—by people who continue to enjoy the benefits 
of membership and identity while no longer participating in the 
activities that produce those benefits.77 
Even though he writes in a political context, Walzer’s observations about 
free riders and unchosen associations apply with equal force in the 
procedural aggregation context.  No rational person chooses to be injured 
by a drug or product, but once it happens to her and to many others with 
aggregated claims, they are all in it together.  Under the current central-
planning model, plaintiffs have few, if any, options to exit the 
                                                     
 75. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 515 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971).  No universal 
definition of “autonomy” exists, but a detailed treatment of the subject is beyond this Article’s 
scope. 
 76. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE 223–25 (2009); CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in 2 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 187, 204 (1985); Michael Walzer, 
The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 15–16 (1990). 
 77. Walzer, supra note 76 (citation omitted); see also SANDEL, supra note 76, at 220 (“If we 
understand ourselves as free and independent selves, unbound by moral ties we haven’t chosen, we 
can’t make sense of a range of moral and political obligations that we commonly recognize, even 
prize.”  Among such obligations, include those “of solidarity and loyalty, historic memory and 
religious faith—moral claims that arise from the communities and traditions that shape our 
identity.”); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 36 (1989). 
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aggregation, though they may remain disengaged from one another.  In 
class action litigation, on the other hand, entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ 
attorneys overcome collective-action problems by initiating litigation on 
others’ behalf.  Of course, it is the entrepreneurial effort of one on 
“behalf” of many that prompts Redish’s democratic critique, that this 
effort undermines the individual decision to sue and to direct the course 
of that lawsuit.78  But, at least technically, in nonclass aggregation no one 
person or small group of attorneys has nearly exclusive control over 
others’ right to sue in tort.  This means, however, that the temptation to 
free-ride is back, as is a new temptation to hold out by strategically 
withholding consent in hopes of a higher payout when a settlement 
demands nearly unanimous consent.  Thus, the question has shifted to 
what role the plaintiffs should play in this nonclass aggregation system—
a system in which they tend to have little control because of the sheer 
numbers of nominally related plaintiffs, the difficulty of communicating 
with multiple clients, and the inherent agency problems that arise when 
one agent represents numerous principals with (sometimes) divergent 
interests. 
Drawing a line around actual, cohesive groups changes the calculus 
in some interesting ways.  First, in order to be in a group, the plaintiffs 
must have implicitly consented.79  As I have explored in greater detail 
elsewhere, once plaintiffs begin communicating with one another about 
their intentions concerning the litigation, they may reach broad 
agreement about particular ends and make promises and assurances to 
one another to act in ways that further those joint ends.80  Those promises 
and assurances form the social glue holding the group together; they are 
moral obligations made voluntarily.  Plus, because individuals have 
exercised their free will to associate with other litigants, this alternative 
line preserves the fundamental tenets of self-determination and consent 
in liberal theory.81  One might claim that this attribute makes these 
groups contractarian.  For instance, as Michael Sandel explains the 
liberal account of obligation: “Whether we must concern ourselves with 
the good of other people depends on whether, and with whom, we have 
agreed to do so.”82  But to claim an exclusively liberal and atomistic 
view ignores the complex psychological and social dynamics of groups, 
                                                     
 78. Redish, supra note 38. 
 79. Burch, supra note 45, at 42–43. 
 80. Id. at 45–46. 
 81. See RAWLS, supra note 75, at 108–17 (explaining that obligations can arise through 
voluntary acts, such as promises and agreements, and natural duties). 
 82. SANDEL, supra note 76, at 224. 
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the moral component of promising, and the transformative nature of 
social relationships—if not in a metaphysical sense, in a pragmatic, 
obligation sense. 
Picking up on this thread of morality and obligation brings me to the 
second way in which redrawing the line around actual, cohesive groups 
changes the litigation calculus.  Group membership means that the 
individuals contained within it have certain obligations to one another.  
Granted, to say that someone is a group member says nothing about the 
nature or content of those obligations.  But suppose that there is a 
proportional and reciprocal obligation (made, once again, through 
voluntarily issued promises, assurances, or even tacit agreements) to 
cooperate with one another.83  The liberal account of obligations as 
consisting of voluntary promises would capture this aspect, but it fails to 
account for obligations of solidarity or membership.84  Put differently, as 
soon as two people disagree over what it is to cooperate and thus what 
they have agreed to do, their obligations to one another may end.  But if 
they have incurred additional obligations of solidarity or membership by 
virtue of being in community with one another, then they’re not off the 
hook so easily (at least morally).85 
It is here that communitarianism plays a role.  Plaintiffs who have 
decided to work together, who have turned themselves into a “plural 
subject,” define the relevant community.86  A “plural subject” might 
mean many things, but I use the term in a basic sense: when a set of 
“‘I’s” becomes a single, plural subject—a “we.”87  When plaintiffs 
decide to harness their fates together, to “pursue our goal” or to “win our 
litigation,” they are in it together.  (I take it as a given here that a special 
officer has helped sort plaintiffs into groups with like injuries and claims 
so that their individual interests align with the group’s collective 
interest.)88  The power of self-determination now rests with the collective 
in a way that furthers communal interests and values, that carries out, in 
other words, their obligations of solidarity.  What’s different, however, is 
                                                     
 83. Although communitarians distinguish between voluntary associations and communities, the 
distinctions are not categorical and the characteristics tend to overlap.  The main question is whether 
social relationships are based on reciprocal empathy, not just a means for attaining an individual 
instrumental end.  Alexander, supra note 59, at 26. 
 84. SANDEL, supra note 76, at 225. 
 85. To be sure, moral obligations can be quite different from legal obligations.  This obligation 
of solidarity does not readily translate into a legal obligation.  See Burch, supra note 44, at 18–20. 
 86. MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2000); see also Burch, supra 
note 45, at 23–26.  I borrow this term from Margaret Gilbert, but do not use it in exactly the same 
way that she does. 
 87. Burch, supra note 45, at 23–26. 
 88. For more about this sorting process, see Burch, supra note 44. 
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that because we are talking principally about a voluntary exercise of the 
will, through commitments and promises to other plaintiffs, we need not 
completely disregard the norms of individual liberalism nor enter the 
morass of hypothetical consent and social-contract theory.89  The “catch” 
from the liberal perspective is that once litigants make reciprocal 
promises and assurances to one another to cooperate, they are not free to 
leave the group if doing so would violate those promises or their 
obligations of solidarity.  Conversely, the disjunction with Sandel’s 
version of communitarianism is that these obligations of solidarity or 
membership arise only after plaintiffs have defined the membership 
through their voluntary association and can be captured, at least initially, 
by an ethic of consent.90 
Consider an analogy to labor unions.  The 1930s Wagner Act made it 
possible for American workers to transform their unified interests and 
solidarity into a formal bargaining unit when a majority of workers 
favored the arrangement.  It thus overcame their collective-action 
problem and, in some ways, the principal-agent problem (though it surely 
created others) by allowing members to vote.  Similarly, by encouraging 
plaintiffs to communicate and associate with one another, several things 
happen.  First, after grouping with others who want similar ends and 
have similar injuries, their interests are more cohesive.  According to 
current class action theory, this justifies binding their interests 
collectively.  Second, they are able—like unionized employees—to 
better negotiate with their attorneys, monitor the litigation, and 
participate in the process.91  Third, unlike unions, the process of 
voluntarily associating with one another does not per se involve those 
who would prefer to be left out of the arrangement altogether.  It thus 
preserves a liberal sense of autonomy: one chooses whether to join the 
group and how much to participate. 
In sum, once we disaggregate the notion of group from the narrow 
inquiry of whether cohesion predates the litigation, we can avoid some of 
the problems caused by treating heterogeneous individuals as if their 
interests are unitary.  Binding interests that become unitary post litigation 
                                                     
 89. See Ronald Dworkin, The Original Position, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 500, 519–33 (1973). 
 90. SANDEL, supra note 76, at 241 (“We’ve been trying to figure out whether all our duties and 
obligations can be traced to an act of will or choice.”  Sandel does not believe they can and argues 
that “obligations of solidarity or membership may claim us for reasons unrelated to a choice—
reasons bound up with the narratives by which we interpret our lives and the communities we 
inhabit.”).  Again, my point here is to use these philosophies in a narrow way, in the context of 
nonclass aggregation, and not to make broader statements about their salience. 
 91. This might include a voting arrangement if the litigants have agreed to an intraclaimant 
governance arrangement.  Burch, supra note 44. 
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eliminates the concern over representing absent group members.  It 
allows present plaintiffs to specify their interests and then pursue 
homogeneous ends together.  Litigating collective interests collectively 
allows plaintiffs to present a unified, credible threat against the 
defendant, to bargain and deliberate about what those collective interests 
are and how they should go about fulfilling them, and to participate in 
the process of pursuing their substantive rights.  Put simply, diverse 
subgroups with heavy plaintiff participation and deliberation are more 
like an actual community (at least with regard to the litigation issues) 
than a class action with absent class members or even classes with a 
preexisting trait that has little to do with actual cohesion. 
B. Community Self-Governance 
Thus far, we have covered the criteria for subgroup membership: 
sharing like intentions toward the defendant; having similar claims and 
injuries; and, most importantly, making promises and assurances to 
cooperate with one another in achieving the group’s joint ends.  The 
event or events giving rise to the litigation—from taking and 
experiencing the effects of the same drug (Vioxx, Zyprexa); to sharing 
circumstances and histories (Vietnam in the Agent Orange Litigation, 
being in the same nightclub fire together, or experiencing the same 
hurricane or flood); to having the same product malfunction in ways that 
change their lives (Bridgestone/Firestone Tire Litigation)—bring people 
with shared emotional connections together.92  As I’ve hinted, in large-
scale litigation it is highly unlikely that all plaintiffs will agree on their 
litigation ends, that they will have the same or even highly similar 
injuries, that they have uniformly strong claims, or that the same laws 
will apply.  Consequently, while further sorting like interests with other 
like interests, subgroups will form. 
Although this situation raises a constellation of questions about how 
these subgroups interact with one another and how they could or should 
reach decisions, my focus here is on a narrower issue.93  If courts 
recognize this alternative line-drawing scheme and foster group 
formation after both the decision to sue and procedural aggregation, what 
                                                     
 92. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1016–17 (7th Cir. 
2002); In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611–12 (E.D. La. 2008); In re Zyprexa 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Gray v. Derderian, 400 F. Supp. 2d 
415, 419–20 (D.R.I. 2005); Louisiana v. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers, 937 So. 2d 313, 316–18 (La. 
2006); PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 25–26 (1986). 
 93. I’ve explored many of these other issues in Burch, supra note 45. 
0.6.0_BURCH FINAL 5/10/2010  12:42:20 PM 
2010] AGGREGATION, COMMUNITY, AND THE LINE BETWEEN 911 
degree of autonomy ought the judicial system afford these litigation 
groups? 
One might think about subgroup and superordinate group autonomy 
and why autonomy is valuable in terms of either pluralist or 
communitarian theories.  Although there is a great deal of tension 
between the two perspectives, both have something to offer modern 
litigation groups.  By pluralists, I mean public-choice theorists who focus 
on the role of and interplay between societal groups, which they view as 
the organizational form for allowing a collection of individuals to further 
their own interest.  Some pluralists might explain the need for group 
autonomy based on the freedom of association: so long as individuals 
have openly agreed to associate, they should be able to establish the 
terms and conditions of their relationships and should be free to leave the 
group whenever they like.94  Other pluralists might contend that having 
diverse subgroups with multiple perspectives on remedies and forceful 
advocacy within litigation helps counter agency problems caused by a 
strong plaintiffs’-attorney steering committee and weak client 
monitoring.95  Empowering groups ensures that their members have 
access to the decision-making process and better insulates them from 
attorney neglect.96 
Pluralist thought takes up the familiar idea pushed by liberals—
individual autonomy—and imports it into the group context by viewing 
groups as an instrumental means for pursuing individual interests.97  The 
group is an association of individuals who each use the group to promote 
their own welfare.98  Accordingly, the prescriptive lesson from pluralist 
thought is that the judicial system should foster and enable group 
formation, help sort plaintiffs into homogeneous subgroups, and enforce 
the rules created through group governance because these rules reflect 
the group’s values and objectives.  Embracing pluralist ideas by 
maintaining subgroups in aggregate litigation introduces dissent, which  
 
                                                     
 94. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 299–306 (1974). 
 95. See W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLITICS: KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION 
IN THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 126–27 (1986); Rhode, supra note 17, at 1223–24.  Robert Dahl has 
written several books providing a general account of pluralism in the political process.  See generally 
ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL (1982); 
ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 22–24 
(1967). 
 96. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 104–05 (1956); MICHAEL 
WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP 224 (1970). 
 97. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 2. 
 98. See id. at 20. 
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often results in better-developed arguments, new ideas, forceful 
advocacy, and—ultimately—increased legitimacy.99 
Like pluralists, communitarians view social groups and the need for 
group autonomy as promoting social good.100  But communitarians 
define “social good,” in part, as the intrinsically invaluable process of 
group participation that leads one to define and fulfill her identity.101  
Communitarianism recognizes that with membership comes obligation—
even when people consent to membership and even when individual 
promises and assurances glue the group together.102  By designing an 
arrangement that reflects members’ commitments to one another and 
captures community preferences for decision making, litigants can 
legitimately curtail exit mechanisms.103  This means, however, that 
litigant communities must have some autonomy to self-govern and that 
the judge should both enforce those arrangements and—by using a 
special officer to avoid bias and the appearance of bias—help coordinate 
subgroup and superordinate group relationships.104 
When plaintiff communities form from plaintiffs’ affective ties with 
each other, those communities mix contractarian and communitarian 
dimensions.  Although plaintiffs may voluntarily enter the group because 
of a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis or for purely instrumental reasons, 
once they are group members and have tied their collective litigation 
fates together, their interactions tend to change their relationships.  Social 
psychologists and behavioral law-and-economics theorists characterize 
this change in terms of developing other-regarding preferences.105  It is 
                                                     
 99. See NEUMAN, supra note 95, at 126–27. 
 100. Alexander, supra note 59, at 30. 
 101. See id. at 30–32 (describing the good as “fulfillment of the self achieved through . . . 
community”). 
 102. See id. at 26–28, 32. 
 103. For other discussion on this topic of exit, see Burch, supra note 45. 
 104. See generally A.L.I., supra note 63, § 3.17, § 1.05(c) (suggesting that judges should 
“enforce parties’ agreements regarding the conduct of litigation” and that litigants might enter into 
an agreement governing their relationship and voting procedures). 
 105. See generally Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 
SCI. 1390 (1981); Kelly S. Bouras & S.S. Komorita, Group Discussion and Cooperation in Social 
Dilemmas, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1144, 1145 (1996); Robert Boyd & Peter J. 
Richerson, Cultural Transmission and the Evolution of Cooperative Behavior, 10 HUM. ECOLOGY 
325 (1982); Nancy R. Buchan et al., Let’s Get Personal: An International Examination of the 
Influence of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other Regarding Preferences, 60 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 373–75 (2006); Joseph Henrich, Cultural Group Selection, 
Coevolutionary Processes and Large-Scale Cooperation, 53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 3 (2004); 
Norbert L. Kerr & Cynthia M. Kaufman-Gilliland, Communication, Commitment, and Cooperation 
in Social Dilemmas, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 513, 526–27 (1994); Mark Van Vugt & 
Claire M. Hart, Social Identity as Social Glue: The Origins of Group Loyalty, 86 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 585, 586 (2004). 
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here that pluralist or liberal thought fails to satisfactorily explain the 
layers within social relationships and where a thicker conception of 
moral obligation is needed.  Otherwise, this account cannot reconcile 
theory with reality.  I thus find the concept of a plural subject a useful 
alternative.106  The theory is that you and I and many others might want 
to do something together, to be jointly committed to attaining a particular 
end and to specifying our day-to-day plans for fulfilling that end without 
becoming an “entity” in the ontological sense, but without acting as 
completely self-regarding individuals either. 
Maintaining subgroups comprised of plural subjects who have 
reached consensus about their litigation ends, who experienced similar 
injuries, and who are thus more than nominally related protects 
individuality without forgoing community.  It also avoids a problem with 
the entity theory, that once the entity exists, it can suppress individual 
objections and cram down subsequent tensions between the principals 
(the litigants) as well as between the principals and the agents.107  
Fostering subgroups of plural subjects requires the aid of a special officer 
who provides information and helps protect voice opportunities within 
subgroups as well as the diversity of groups themselves.  Put differently, 
the special officer maintains group pluralism and each group designs its 
own governance.108 
Maintaining a pluralistic subgroup structure does, however, create 
tension between unity and cohesion on one hand and diversity on the 
other.  There is a risk that strongly autonomous groups will alienate 
themselves from other plaintiffs.  When a settlement offer demands 
nearly unanimous consent, the larger community must decide what to do 
and how to go about doing it.  If the overarching community lacks 
consensus, then it can resolve the dilemma by arguing, bargaining, 
voting, or any combination thereof.109  Plaintiffs might aggregate 
                                                     
 106. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 107. See Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 374. 
 108. I have suggested in Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations that plaintiffs 
might design a representative structure, where some subgroup members would represent the interests 
of the subgroup on a steering committee.  Burch, supra note 44, at 42–45.  Most communitarians 
would say that political participation must be unmediated in this way and that members’ views 
should be filtered through an intermediary.  See, e.g., BENJAMIN B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: 
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 261 (1984); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1067–73 (1980).  The reality, however, is that some litigants may not want 
the litigation to become their lives; they have other demands on their time that they must prioritize. 
 109. Jon Elster, Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 1, 5 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).  Will 
Kymlicka describes a similar dilemma over governance in countries that are both multinational and 
polyethnic: 
Self-government rights, however, do pose a threat to social unity.  The sense of being a 
distinct nation within a larger country is potentially destabilizing.  On the other hand, the 
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members’ preferences (voting), transform members’ preferences through 
deliberation, or misrepresent members’ preferences by acting 
strategically.110 
Deliberating and voting are particularly relevant to the subgroup and 
superordinate community structure.  A system with a mix of deliberating 
and voting would first allow plaintiffs to deliberate over the merits and 
fairness of the settlement offer in an attempt to transform preferences.  
After hearing those arguments (provided that plaintiffs have agreed to a 
collective decision-making arrangement),111 plaintiffs would vote.  That 
vote would bind the entire community.  Both deliberating and bargaining 
may play a role when plaintiffs, with their attorneys’ advice, first decide 
on and consent to a collective decision-making arrangement.  For 
example, plaintiffs with more severe injuries and fewer causation 
problems might legitimately push for a weighted voting structure that 
would lessen the potential for a majority of claimants with weaker claims 
to dilute the voting pool.112  All plaintiffs would have equality of access 
to the deliberation process, but not all plaintiffs would have equal voting 
strength.113 
Notice the parallel between genuine dialogue within the plaintiff 
community about decision making and the idea of a deliberative 
democracy where “democracy revolves around the transformation rather 
than simply the aggregation of preferences.”114  Just as participation and 
deliberation by those who are subject to collective decisions enhances 
democratic legitimacy, it also enhances judicial legitimacy by supplying 
a fundamental component of procedural justice—the right to participate 
and be heard.115  To create and maintain community, deliberation is not 
                                                                                                                       
denial of self-government rights is also destabilizing, since it encourages resentment and 
even secession.  Concerns about social unity will arise however we respond to self-
government claims. 
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limited to arguments or rhetoric, but includes storytelling, personal 
testimony, humor, reasons, explanations, and even gossip.116  
Communicating in this way allows plaintiffs to influence and, if they so 
desire, to vote and be bound by collective outcomes. 
Thus, if we define democracy as the extent to which the preferences 
of the governed influence collective outcomes, then reconceiving the 
line-drawing scheme can preserve and further core democratic values.117  
Granted, this concept of democracy is abstract, but it must be.  Opinions 
about democracy vary greatly—from communitarian to liberal—and 
truly democratic decisions must reflect the collective preferences of the 
governed. 
During deliberation, certain norms of propositional truth, rightness, 
and truthfulness tend to steer and anchor debates, thereby compelling 
even self-interested members to phrase their arguments in terms of what 
is best for the group.118  As I have argued elsewhere, group membership 
and deliberation may have a transformative effect that leads to other-
regarding preferences and thereby diminishes the potential for actors to 
behave purely as homo economicus.119  But to reach this point, we must 
be willing to recognize that we communicate with one another in new 
ways, that communities are not limited to workplaces or neighborhoods, 
and that true communities and regard for others arise out of our affective 
ties—regardless of whether those ties exist before or after the decision to 
sue. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article reconsiders the line-drawing scheme for nonclass 
aggregation and hews historic rationales for group treatment to fit a new 
kind of group.  Put simply, once the judicial system determines that class 
                                                                                                                       
process and procedural fairness); Linda Musante et al., The Effects of Control on Perceived Fairness 
of Procedures and Outcomes, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 223, 237–38 (1983) (describing a 
study where “[r]egardless of role in a dispute, the opportunity to exercise control through the 
selection of a decision rule (no matter what the rule) resulted in enhanced evaluations of all aspects 
of the trial experience”); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 571, 602–04 (1997) (discussing the extent to which a class member has a right to 
participate in class litigation). 
 116. See DRYZEK, supra note 115, at 1 (applying a “tolerant position” on what constitutes 
authentic deliberation).  For other variations on what counts as deliberation, see Elster, supra note 
109, at 8–9. 
 117. DRYZEK, supra note 115, at 2. 
 118. See generally 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas 
McCarthy trans., 1987). 
 119. Burch, supra note 44, at 28-32; Burch, supra note 45, at 47–53. 
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action treatment is inappropriate, but litigants meet the loose 
requirements for party and claim joinder under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 20 and 42, then judges should foster communication and 
dialogue among the plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs who communicate with one 
another—regardless of whether they are in the same geographic 
location—often form social bonds, as do, for example, Navy moms, 
Army wives, and hurricane victims.  Somewhat like medieval 
communities, they actually share affective ties and their relationships 
evolve organically.  This alternative scheme thus avoids presupposing 
unity where none actually exists.  By relying on plaintiffs’ voluntary 
promises and assurances to one another rather than on preexisting 
external conditions such as the same skin color, employer, gender, or 
injuries, this amended line need not bind litigants based on fictitious 
notions of representation. 
This line allows litigants to embrace more of a democratic ideal; the 
communication process helps plaintiffs identify and specify their 
litigation ends, sort themselves into groups with like-minded individuals, 
and, ultimately, use this process to make key decisions about litigation 
strategy and when and whether to settle.  No longer can one attorney or 
one group of attorneys make autocratic decisions on the group’s behalf.  
Correspondingly, the judicial system’s role is to afford the group some 
autonomy to self-govern, subject to the special officer’s aid and 
oversight.  That governance regime is ultimately constrained by due 
process, the mechanisms by which due process makes its way into each 
state’s rules of professional conduct, and adequate representation.120  Yet, 
it allows plaintiffs to cooperate with one another, to bind themselves to 
the group process, and to limit or eliminate their ability to exit that 
group.  By questioning the assumption that groups must predate the 
decision to sue, particularly in mass-tort litigation, we can avoid tenuous 
justifications about interest representation and hypothetical consent and 
make process more democratic. 
                                                     
 120. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 756 (1989) (stating that “the linchpin of the 
‘impermissible collateral attack’ doctrine—the attribution of preclusive effect to a failure to 
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